The UAE Is Winning the World’s Capital. Southern Africa Should Be Reading the Fine Print

There is a number in the newly released UNCTAD World Investment Report 2026 that deserves more attention across Southern African policy and investment circles than it has received. It is not an African number. It is Emirati.
In 2025, the United Arab Emirates attracted a record US$48.24 billion in foreign direct investment — a six percent increase on the previous year, and its fourth consecutive record. That performance lifted the UAE to ninth place among the world’s FDI destinations, ahead of Mexico, India and Australia, and comfortably first in the Middle East, well clear of Saudi Arabia in thirteenth. It happened, moreover, against the current: global FDI managed only a narrow, fragile recovery to US$1.6 trillion, and Africa’s own inflows eased to roughly US$70 billion from the exceptional highs of 2024.
The instinct in Maputo, Luanda or Lusaka might be to file this under “Gulf news.” That would be a mistake. The composition of the UAE’s inbound capital, and the direction of its outbound capital, together describe an opportunity that Southern Africa is currently positioned to miss.
Quality, not just quantity
What makes the Emirati figure strategically interesting is not its size but its character. The UAE ranked second in the world for the number of greenfield projects — new productive capacity rather than the reshuffling of existing assets — for the third year running, with greenfield accounting for close to 45 percent of all inflows. The sectors leading that investment were manufacturing and digital infrastructure, not hydrocarbons. Greenfield activity alone generated more than 65,000 jobs.
This is the profile of an economy that has stopped competing on oil and started competing on productivity, logistics and technology. It is also the profile of an economy generating surplus capital, expertise and institutional capacity that must find a home beyond its borders. The question for the continent is a simple one: where does that capital go?
The other side of the ledger: outbound capital
The inbound record has a counterpoint that Southern African readers should study just as closely. UAE outbound FDI fell to roughly US$63 billion in 2025, down from around US$77 billion the year before, and the Emirates slipped from sixth to ninth among the world’s largest home economies for investment. It nonetheless remains one of the ten biggest exporters of capital on the planet, in the company of China, Hong Kong and Singapore — and where its outbound capital has gone in Africa, it has gone big, in single projects measured in the tens of billions of dollars.
For Africa, the contraction cuts two ways. A smaller outbound pool does not mean less Emirati interest in the continent; it means a more selective deployment of it. Capital that is scarcer is also choosier — it flows to jurisdictions that arrive with prepared, bankable, de-risked propositions, and bypasses those that expect the capital to do the organising itself. In a year when the UAE wrote fewer cheques abroad, the ones it did write went to markets that had done the groundwork. That is not a discouraging signal for Southern Africa. It is a precise instruction.
The Gulf turns toward Africa — but not evenly
Here UNCTAD is unusually direct. The report identifies the Gulf, by name, as part of an expanding group of investors moving into Africa’s strategic sectors — energy infrastructure, critical minerals, logistics, renewable energy and selected manufacturing. This is significant. It is one thing for a Dubai-based practitioner to argue that Gulf capital is turning toward Africa; it is another for the United Nations’ flagship investment report to say so. The thesis now carries institutional weight.
But the report’s specifics tell a more precise story. The marquee UAE-backed projects UNCTAD highlights on the continent are the US$34 billion Infinity Power renewable-energy platform in Mauritania, the US$24 billion Ras El Hikma urban development in Egypt, and a US$6 billion green-hydrogen project in Tunisia. Three flagship investments — and all three sit in North and West Africa.
Southern Africa is absent from that list. And the region’s own strong showings in the data are not Gulf-driven: Mozambique’s surge, to around US$6 billion, is led by the resumption of its liquefied natural gas projects, while Angola’s return to positive inflows — its first after nearly a decade of net divestment — is anchored in oil and gas. The capital is flowing to Southern Africa. It is simply not yet flowing from the Gulf into Southern Africa at any comparable scale.
The frontier hiding in plain sight
This is precisely why the gap should be read as opportunity rather than as absence. The structural groundwork for a Gulf–Southern Africa corridor is already being laid, quietly, outside the report’s headline projects.
Mauritius — a SADC member — brought its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE into force in April 2025, proving the model works within the bloc. Angola followed, signing its own CEPA during a UAE state visit in August 2025, with projections of US$10 billion in annual bilateral trade by 2033 and nearly 30,000 jobs once ratified. That agreement did not arrive alone: it came bundled with a central-bank memorandum, an agriculture partnership, and an existing on-the-ground footprint that includes a Masdar solar project, a Dubai Investments industrial park, and an AD Ports terminal at the Port of Luanda. These are not paper commitments. They are a template.
What remains missing is coordination. The UAE’s relationship with the region is being built one economy at a time — Mauritius here, Angola there — with Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania still at the groundwork stage. There is no UAE–SADC framework at the level of the bloc. The connective tissue is bilateral, and therefore fragmented.
What UNCTAD actually recommends
The closing argument writes itself, because UNCTAD supplies it. The report’s central message this year is that the challenge is no longer how much investment arrives, but whether it is converted into industrial development — through supplier development, local processing, and, in the report’s own framing, regional corridors that connect smaller markets to larger production systems.
That is a near-exact description of what a coordinated Southern African value proposition to Gulf capital would deliver. Individually, most SADC economies are small markets carrying high perceived risk. Collectively, linked by corridors and presented as a single structured opportunity, they become the kind of destination that surplus Emirati capital — patient, greenfield-oriented, infrastructure-hungry — is actively seeking.
The UAE has told the world what it is looking for: new industrial and logistics locations, energy transition assets, and critical minerals. Southern Africa holds all three. The World Investment Report 2026 confirms the Gulf is on its way to Africa. It also shows that the south of the continent is not yet where it is landing.
The regions that will benefit from the next investment cycle are the ones that organise themselves before the capital arrives, not after. For Southern Africa, that window is open now. It will not stay open indefinitely.
Abdulla Momade writes on Gulf–Africa investment, SADC energy and regional trade. The views expressed are his own.
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